Is are actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence?

Military applications

WSNs are used by the military for a number of purposes such as monitoring militant activity in remote areas and force protection. Being equipped with appropriate sensor nodes, these networks enable detection of enemy movement, identification of enemy force and analysis of their movement and progress [39].

Acoustic sensor arrays suspended below tethered aerostats are used to detect and localize transient signals from mortars, artillery and small arms fire. The airborne acoustic sensor array calculates an azimuth and elevation to the originating transient, and immediately cues a collocated imager. By providing additional solution vectors from several ground-based acoustic arrays, unattended ground sensor systems can augment aerostat arrays to perform a 3D triangulation on a source location [29].

The anti-submarine warfare concept uses small sensors with passive and active sonar to detect modern diesel submarines operating on batteries. Hundreds or thousands of sensor nodes are deployed to provide a high density sensor field. Low-cost sensor nodes have a short detection range. Hence they are far less susceptible to multipath reverberations and other acoustic artifacts [37].

The capability of a WSN military application is dependent on the type and capabilities of sensor nodes, wireless communications architecture, coverage, and appropriate information processing, fusion and knowledge generation. For more military applications, the reader may refer to [7].

How the Military Defends Against SE

As discussed earlier, the military has been in the spy-counterspy business from the beginning. The counterspy techniques are the same skills needed to defend against SE. Today’s solider needs to understand counterintelligence (CI), counterterrorism, force protection, and Operational Security (OPSEC) techniques. This section will focus on the tactical level actions that can be done for CI. First let’s review the doctrinal definitions for the key concepts:

CI: Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities [6].

Cyber CI: Measures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions [6].

Counterespionage: That aspect of CI designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities [6].

Counterterrorism: Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks [6].

Force Protection: Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease [6].

OPSEC: A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: (a) identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; (b) determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and (c) select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation [6].

The military depends on confidentiality and secrecy. They deploy encryption, data classification, clearances for their personnel, and a thorough set of processes and regulations. Soldiers, airmen, seamen, and marines understand the trust they have been given and the level of national security compromise that could occur (not necessarily through a single loss of data but the aggregate knowledge impact as well). Cybersecurity has become a critical component of the National Counterintelligence Strategy (see Figure 8.3). The mission to secure the nation against foreign espionage and electronic penetration of the IC, DoD, and to protect U.S. economic advantage, trade secrets, and know-how is becoming a core responsibility for the military.

CI has an offensive aspect as well. There is a need to set up internal traps or as they are called in cyberspace “honey pots” to attract insiders accessing information they are not authorized for. These honey pots will also capture outside threats that have gained access. Another technique organizations should consider is to have enticing files with embedded beacons that report back on where they end up when stolen to provide situational awareness on what has leaked out and who did it. Organizations need to fund programs to gain access to the types of organizations that have the motives and means to attack the United States and see what they have stolen. Organizations need to conduct exercises and tests on our personnel to assess our readiness level. Finally, we need to enforce consequences on individuals caught violating policies.

Defense Missions, Environments, and Usability

Defense systems are utilized to train, support, and employ military forces. As the first column in Table 6.1 illustrates, these systems can be used for a variety of strategic, operational, or tactical joint military essential tasks (Universal Joint Task Manual, 2011). These tasks cover the range of operations performed by military users to observe, orient, decide, and act in warfare, the so called OODA-loop. As listed in the first column, these include intelligence, command and control of operations (including course of action analysis and execution monitoring and assessment), performance of operations, force protection, and support of combat operations (e.g., education, medical, mobility, and refueling). Accordingly, the environments in which forces and users operate can range significantly as shown in the second column of Table 6.1. Environments range physically (e.g., land, air, sea, and space), temporally (from real time to long term), politically (national vs. international users; degree of domestic and international unity), in terms of freedom of movement (uncontested vs. contested vs. denied), culturally (e.g., language, religion), economically (expense of the system acquisition and use), collaboration-wise (single vs. group), distribution-wise (collocated vs. distributed), and in terms of their realism (live vs. virtual vs. constructed).

Table 6.1. Defense Missions, Environments, and Usability

As is evident from this discussion, broad sets of missions and environments can drive a variety of dimensions of usability such as physical, perceptual, cognitive, emotional, or collaborative. Accordingly, usability of defense systems needs to take into account measures often beyond traditional assessments of physical, perceptual, and cognitive ergonomics and supporting accessibility. Given the harsh environments, it is important to also take into consideration issues such as system reliability, error recoverability (both for unintentional user errors as well as malicious insiders), reliability and robustness under adverse conditions including adversary attacks, and autonomy in complex environments.

In order to better understand the relation among missions, environment, and usability, we consider a particular case study, namely the rapid growth of RPA and associated RPA pilots.

Role of the Protection Officer

A proactive approach on the part of any business and every individual leads to minimization, if not elimination, of hazardous materials incidents. Education and training that specifically include a full explanation of all the materials that move through or are used within a facility is the first line of defense. Understanding the terminology and federally mandated response framework is a critical part of that training. The fact is, there is nothing heroic or exciting about maintaining good and safe work practices, and proper site security, to eliminate the possibility of an incident occurring. That is the unglorious but real challenge for the professional protection officer. Yet, in today’s world, where the “all hazards approach” has become the standard, weather-related incidents and hazardous materials incidents represent the majority of recurring serious incidents in the workplace.

Awareness of the evolving technologies and the inherent dangers of many new products is an often overlooked part of this job. Today’s products, including products carried and used by protection professionals, represent their own set of new and unique hazardous material challenges. Here are some examples of new, and in some cases variations on older, products that represent new and often times overlooked or misunderstood hazards:

Ethanol-enhanced fuels. It requires a different kind of foam to fight an ethanol- or alcohol-based fire than a gasoline- or petroleum-based fire. Knowing that ethanol is being moved may require a facility, and its protection force, to increase the type and number of both portable firefighting devices and fire suppression systems available.

Lithium ion batteries. These batteries are one of the most dangerous products that are used in everything from toys to oxygen-generating vests, aircraft black boxes to computers and UPS backup power supplies. These batteries present such a great risk in transportation, as distinct from their individual use in consumer products, that the international community has assigned new identification numbers for them; and in the 2008 Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG), for the first time in over 12 years the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) added a new guide number. That is particularly significant because there are over five million different hazardous materials but there are only 66 guides in the ERG. If lithium ion batteries are short-circuited they will generate a tremendous amount of power, usually in the form of heat. There are very few satisfactory firefighting techniques for lithium ion battery fires. Realistically, lithium ion batteries, like magnesium, burn at extremely high temperatures and can break down water into oxygen and hydrogen, which is an explosive mixture. While not always practical, the most effective way to fight fires by what are known as “refractory” substances, is to bury them with sand and deny them the oxygen required to support continued combustion.

Compact fluorescent lights (CFLs). All fluorescent lighting contains mercury and it is illegal to dispose of such lightbulbs by merely discarding them in the trash. If any quantity of fluorescent lightbulbs are broken, it would generate a surprisingly large release of mercury requiring separate and specific federally mandated cleanup activities. A single broken lightbulb is not a cause for alarm; however, it is still officially an “event” because mercury, which is extremely toxic, has been released into the environment.

Pressurized fire extinguishers. While fire extinguishers are important to have on hand for safety reasons, the heat generated from a fire can cause those fire extinguishers to explode.

Aerosol lubricants and deicing materials. These materials are not regulated for private use, so if a private individual has them in a vehicle there are no federal safety “rules” that apply. However, under the U.S. DOT guideline 49 CFR 173.6, if one has those materials in a patrol vehicle, they become “materials of trade” and certain rules do apply. Those rules are based primarily on individual awareness of the inherent hazards of such materials and the need to properly secure them.

The portable radio and the cell phone as well as the “green” vehicle being used for patrol duties all might represent their own unique hazards. Understanding, and therefore minimizing, the possibility of untoward events involving hazardous materials requires a full awareness of the workplace environment, the products used, and the nature of all materials from janitorial supplies to production processes to power generation and finished products of the business being protected.

13.4.3 The Northern Virginia Military Shooting Series13

The war on terrorism has generated a variety of new challenges for law enforcement agencies attempting to protect our homeland, while addressing routine crime issues that generally defined their purview prior to 9/11. Perhaps one of the biggest challenges is stretching already diminished personnel and budget resources to accommodate the additional responsibilities associated with the war on terrorism. The concept of fourth-generation warfare and implications for local law enforcement is discussed in Chapter 12; however, the direct impact on resource allocation and deployment can be understood regardless of the cause.

Prior to 9/11, most agencies were in the unenviable position of doing more with less, particularly with diminishing economic resources. After that date, local agencies increasingly became responsible for collecting and compiling additional data and information, increased deployment related to sensitive or high-profile locations, and periodic escalation in readiness associated with heightened threat levels. Agencies already coping with limited troop strength lost additional personnel to military activation, federal hiring, and reallocated resources to homeland security tasks and task forces. In addition, these new responsibilities frequently transcend jurisdictional boundaries and functional domains requiring cooperation and collaboration between local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations, as well as various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies.

Doing more with less requires smart, data-based, results-driven deployment strategies. Personnel resources, in particular, need to be allocated judiciously to ensure complete coverage and maintain the ability to respond adequately. This is true not only for routine patterns of offending and enforcement but for rapidly emerging homeland-security-related functions as well. Predictive analytics and information-based approaches to deployment facilitate the provision of more science and less fiction in personnel deployment. Similarly, enhancements to and integration of predictive analytics capabilities and mapping tools offer additional opportunities for the development of operationally relevant and actionable analytic output that can move from the analysis unit directly into the operational environment.

In October of 2010, the law enforcement community in Virginia was faced with a series of shootings into facilities of interest to the United States military including the Pentagon, a United States Marine Corps (USMC) recruiting facility in Chantilly, and two separate incidents involving the National Museum of the Marine Corps. In addition to the significance of the facilities targeted, this series was eerily reminiscent of the DC Sniper series, which also occurred in October 8 years earlier in the same general location. Adding to the concern regarding this particular series, autumn in northern Virginia is associated with several high-profile, well-attended events of interest to the military community including Veteran’s Day, the Marine Corps Birthday, and the Marine Corps Marathon. Given this context, the question on everyone’s mind was, was this a prelude to something more sinister? Would the shooter be content shooting into unoccupied buildings, or would they move from shooting at things to targeting people and were these high-profile events at risk?

Figure 13.11 illustrates the location of the first four incidents in the series, which covered an area of approximately 750 square miles14 and spanned multiple police jurisdictions to include local, county, state, and federal. Moreover, given the nature of the targets, various DHS component agencies and United States Department of Defense (DoD), including the Pentagon Police and force protection elements also became involved. Despite the broad agency response and involvement, though, the area of interest was still too broad to cover effectively and included thousands of possible targets given the heavy DoD presence in the area. Therefore, in an effort to more efficiently allocate and optimize resources geospatial predictive analysis was employed by a multiagency team at the Virginia Fusion Center.

Geospatial predictive analysis is a rule induction model that is based on the fact that behavior generally is not homogenous or uniformly distributed.15 Rather, people tend to develop place preferences that can be statistically characterized, and the generated models used to reliably anticipate future behavior. Criminal place preferences tend to reflect two related needs. First is a requirement for access to a victim and/or potential target. Second is selection of an environment where they believe that they can successfully perpetrate their desired act by leveraging enabling factors and/or avoiding possible deterrents or other factors that would thwart or otherwise mitigate the consequences of their act. Again, these factors tend to be both offense and offender specific. One offender’s deterrent could represent the preferred target for another. For example, while many criminals actively avoid law enforcement and other security forces, extremist groups in the Middle East and Africa may preferentially target these resources.

The results of the analysis are illustrated in Figure 13.12. Shaded areas in the map indicate an increased likelihood for a future incident. Again, the first four incidents occurred over a broad area covering approximately 750 square miles. Given the large area of interest and resource limitations, the model thresholds were adjusted to reveal the top 2% most likely locations, enabling the team to reduce the overall search space by 98%. Of special relevance to this particular series, the statistical model created also could be projected to novel, noncontiguous locations rather than confining the analysis to those locations that are in close proximity to or contiguous with previous incidents; a critical feature given the geographically dispersed nature of the previous incidents.

Three days after the original analysis was briefed, a new shooting was reported at the US Coast Guard Recruiting Center in Woodbridge, Virginia. Although there were no direct ties to the USMC, this location had been identified previously by the model as being at high likelihood for a future incident. Moreover, while correlational, these models also can surface factors associated with an increased likelihood for a future incident. In this particular series, variables identified were associated with easy egress from the targets, in addition to cemeteries and motels. While the easy egress is relatively common, identification of cemeteries and motels were particularly concerning given the planned activities for Veteran’s Day and the Marine Corps Birthday celebrations, respectively.

Operationally relevant and actionable, the geospatial predictive analysis was loaded onto laptops and shared with personnel in the participating agencies on a “need to know” basis to support information-based deployment decisions, including allocation of patrol resources, as well as surveillance assets.16 Again, the primary goal for risk-based deployment is to create an unattractive environment and suppress future incidents. Based on the analysis, deployment was adjusted. The operational end users were able to use the output to support information-based decisions regarding allocation and optimization of their resources in an effort to prevent future incidents.

After these results were deployed, the shootings stopped. As with many cases like this, it is impossible to know exactly why the shooter stopped. Did the shooter get sick, die, move out of the area, or was he or she arrested for another crime? Even if the heavy deployment in locations the shooter preferred that was guided by the analysis did cause him or her to stop, he or she may not have been consciously aware of it; criminal place preferences can be extremely subtle and nuanced, and the shooter may only have been aware of a general level of comfort, or conversely a new uneasiness with a particular environment or location. Ultimately, though, whether this effort caused the series to stop or some other factor was driving the shooter’s activity, the important point is that the shootings stopped and no one got hurt. The crime analyst can live with the uncertainty regarding the actual cause.

Approximately 6 months after the last shooting incident, on June 17, 2011 a USMC Reservist, Yonathan Melaku was apprehended in the Arlington National Cemetery. Search of the backpack that he was carrying at the time of his arrest and a subsequent search of his residence revealed supplies and instructions for making improvised explosive devices (IEDs), extremist materials including references to Osama bin Laden and The Path to Jihad, videotaped and other physical evidence linking him to the previous shootings, and spray paint, which he was going to use to deface the grave markers of service personnel from Iraq and Afghanistan.17 Investigators familiar with the case reinforced earlier concerns regarding the potential for escalation in this series, noting that it was, “unclear what might have been coming had he not been caught.”18 As can be seen in Figure 13.13, he was apprehended in an area determined previously to be at high likelihood for a future incident, which provides additional validation for the model.

In addition to the direct analytic value of geospatial predictive analysis, this particular case also highlights the benefit associated with the fusion center model. Given the cross-jurisdictional nature of the series, local, county, state and federal agencies, as well as DHS and DoD elements were actively supporting the investigation. Leveraging the fusion center model, the Virginia Fusion Center was able to provide the vertical and horizontal integration of data and other resources necessary to effective respond to the series. Moreover, in a unique public–private partnership, the Virginia Fusion Center was able to secure and functionally optimize advanced analytics technology and other resources, to include trained data scientists in support of coordinated action and mutual analytic support, creating an analytic force multiplier by establishing their fusion center as a managed service cell supporting the various agencies responding to the series and validating the fusion center concept.

Promoting Effective Customer Relations Within the Security Force

There are a number of steps that security supervisors can take to enhance the customer relations capabilities of their subordinates.

To start with, the supervisor’s basic personnel management skills should be effective enough to minimize the “malcontent syndrome.” Security officers should not be forced to work long hours without relief, miss out on vacations or days off, or be constantly given less-than-desirable assignments.

Security supervisors should conduct an inspection and briefing of each shift prior to that shift going on duty and “on stage.” Security supervisors should take this opportunity, whether it is done formally in groups or informally with individual officers. This inspection should include a physical inspection of equipment, officer appearance, and officer demeanor. It should also include an evaluation which shows that each officer knows what has happened during previous shifts and what is happening that day on the work site.

Brief each department member on current events within the work site, as well as on current problems and changes in procedures. This helps to make the protection force members function as ambassadors for the organization.

In addition to this daily refresher training, supervisors should make certain that the following work behaviors are adopted by all security force members during periodic staff meetings or other methods of professional development:

Have necessary references at the ready. These may include staff directories, maps, telephone books, procedures, and anything else that the person you serve is likely to inquire about.

Be ready and capable of responding to security problems, such as fires, bomb threats, disorderly persons, and other critical incidents, in a prompt and professional manner. Developing proficiency in dealing with people in crisis is a good investment for anyone in security.

Present a professional appearance at all times. Neatness and precision should be obvious attributes of all security officers, easily seen by even the most casual observer. Alertness, openness, and concern must be radiated by posture and behavior.

Be prepared to do the job by having the necessary tools for the job. Always have a pen—or better yet, two pens—and a small notepad to write down important notes or to give someone directions. Never come to work without a watch, a small pocket knife, and a pocket flashlight. If your job calls for other hardware, such as keys, handcuffs, mace, or defensive weapons, be sure they are all in place on the utility belt and in top operating condition.

Two additional pieces of equipment that project the image of security are the officer’s ID card and two-way radio. The ID card should be worn in an obvious location on the front of the uniform. Avoid using a strap around the neck to hold the card, for this would place the officer in jeopardy during physical confrontations. Likewise, the two-way radio should be worn in a holster or fastened to the belt by a belt clip. This leaves the officer’s hands free.

The officers should be instructed to make personal introductions properly. A smile, a look in the eye, and a firm handshake are all important aspects of human relations that security personnel must master. Security personnel must be salespeople. As representatives of management, they must sell themselves, the department, and the work site to everyone who enters the site.

Be especially attentive to the security officer’s breath. They should be instructed to never ingest alcohol, garlic, tobacco, onions, or other items that might leave an offensive odor when speaking to someone. Breath mints are a necessary tool for the public relations-minded security officer. Making it a rule that no one on the security team be allowed to drink alcoholic beverages 8 hours prior to a shift, and no smoking or tobacco chewing be allowed during the hours of work, will go far in ensuring that the officer’s breath will be pleasant.

Encourage the officers to be “professionally connected.” This means that officers should complete certification programs that clearly demonstrate to other members of the parent organization, and customers alike, the officer’s professional achievement. Seniority alone is not the answer to this; neither is experience from previous employment.

Aside from certification programs, the officers should belong to professional organizations for security and safety professionals. There should be professional literature available for officers to read: something which generally comes automatically with membership in professional organizations.

In addition to the above suggestions, the officers must be introspective regarding their own worldviews, beliefs, fears, suspicions, biases, prejudices, and insecurities toward dealing with certain categories of individuals (Hess & Wrobleski, 1996).

The International Chiefs of Police Training Key 94 contains suggestions for improving one-on-one communications, which would be greatly helpful during attempts to serve the needs of others. The following recommendations are adaptations taken from those suggestions (Fay, 1993):

Officers should always remain polite, respectful, and sensitive to the needs of the person being served. Use empathy, not sympathy, in dealing with people. Remember that you have no more power than that of any other citizen; you are not a police officer (even sworn officers must realize that power struggles are unproductive). Remain detached, and ignore personal insults. You are only enforcing your employer’s policies and procedures; they are not your policies and procedures. The insults are actually directed at your employer or the situation, not at you.

Be businesslike at all times. Treat the person you are interacting with the way you would want to be treated under similar circumstances. Anger, impatience, contempt, dislike, sarcasm, and similar attitudes have no place in public relations.

Treat each contact as a process, consisting of several phases, instead of a happening. Slow everything down, and take time to evaluate the environment you are about to enter. Size things up as accurately as possible before making contact.

Remember that although you intend to deliver customer satisfaction with each contact, be it conflict resolution, or simple assistance, it must be resolved within the guidelines of civil law, criminal law, administrative law, policy, procedure, and ethics. Be sure not to stray outside these parameters.

Avoid arguing at all times. Never back the person you are dealing with into a corner. If the situation becomes heated, give or get space, and continue to use verbal deescalation to defuse the situation.

Avoid giving the impression that your presence should be interpreted as a threat. Your demeanor should project your concern and care for the needs of the person you are interacting with. A great opening statement is “How can I help you?”

Even if the person you come in contact with is being aggressive, avoid physical contact if at all possible. Use verbal deescalation whenever possible. If physical contact is necessary, be sure that your physical response is in self-defense, reasonable, and necessary. Most of all, remember that your physical response may be witnessed by the general public, and therefore, must look professional. It must appear that you are in control.

You are under no obligation to disarm an assailant with a knife or a gun, or to chase down an assailant. Officer safety comes first. Instead of disarming or capturing the bad guy, evacuate the area, create a safety zone, and keep your distance until assistance can arrive. This will look a lot more professional to the media and will keep everyone safe.

6.1 Military applications

The usage of sensors in military can be divided into four basic categories: battlefield application, infrastructural application, application beyond the battlefield, and force protection. Some good reads are available on military application in [1,2].

In the battlefield, sensors with different measurement techniques are used for different arms technology. Distributed self-contained acoustic position systems and accelerometer sensors provide antitank landmines [158] with sensing information regarding threats from their neighbors states and help to respond. Future technological scenarios of landmines are discussed in [159].

Airborne acoustic sensors are used in aerostat arrays to detect and calculate the positions of transient signals from mortar, artillery, and small arms fire while ground acoustic sensors are used to localize the source [160]. Also, to detect and localize battery operated modern submarines, low cost passive and active acoustic sensors are used [161].

To detect hazardous chemicals, low-cost chemical sensors are deployed in an unmanned aerial vehicle. To avoid false alarm, the sensors are fused with three color filtered photo-diode detectors, which can distinguish terrain variation due to different chemical emissions [162].

To secure the military infrastructure from enemy attack, sonar and seismic sensors are deployed to detect enemy soldiers approaching. In this security system, only the images matched with the sonar sensors are transmitted.

Acoustic localization is performed to protect soldiers from sniper attack. Two acoustic arrays and a day/night video camera mounted on the soldier’s helmet are used to localize the source of the shooter [163–165].