If a consumer were to pursue products and services that seemed to alleviate

1.2 Dissonance Revolution

Our discussion starts with cognitive dissonance—one of the most prominent topics in social psychology. The central thesis of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is that when two beliefs are inconsistent, individuals experience negatively arousing cognitive conflict (called dissonance). Because the dissonance is aversive, the individuals try to reduce it by changing one or the other beliefs. For example, when making a difficult decision, individuals show attitude change that justifies the decision. In this case, individuals who face such a decision are conflicted because not all beliefs are consistent with the decision. For example, they may have beliefs favoring the option that is rejected. The individuals are therefore motivated to reduce the conflict by justifying the decision they have made. The justification is typically achieved by changing their attitudes and beliefs so that the new attitudes and beliefs are consistent with and justify the decision that has been made. Notably, the resulting attitude change can be long lasting (Sharot, Fleming, Yu, Koster, & Dolan, 2012). By nature, then, we may be rationalizing beings, ready to justify what we have done after the fact.

Dissonance theory revolutionized social psychology by emphasizing the role of cognition in social behavior. More importantly, it also provided the first testable framework in which to conceptualize how cognition could be motivated and how the motivated cognition could yield some intriguing forms of social behavior. The theory enabled us, both in and outside of social psychology, to reflect on potentially unflattering aspects of the human mind. Indeed, the influence of dissonance theory went far beyond the field of social psychology. The term dissonance has since become incorporated into the English vernacular.

3.2 Cognitive Consistency

The number of variations within this approach to self-evaluation regulation is also substantial. An example of this approach is cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957). According to dissonance theory, self-esteem is threatened by inconsistency. Holding beliefs that are logically or ‘psychologically’ inconsistent, i.e., dissonant, with one another is uncomfortable. For example, suppose a student agrees to a request to write an essay in favor of a tuition increase at her school. Her knowledge that she is opposed to a tuition increase is dissonant with her knowledge that she agreed to write an essay in favor of a tuition increase. One way to reduce this threatening dissonance is for the student to change her attitude to be more in favor of a tuition increase.

Note that social comparison mechanisms and consistency reduction mechanisms are both self-enhancement strategies, yet they seem to have little in common. Threat from dissonance rarely has anything to do with the performance of another, i.e., social comparison. Similarly, inconsistency is generally irrelevant to an SEM threat, whereas other's performance is crucial. Attitude change is the usual mode of dissonance threat reduction; on the other hand, changes in closeness, performance, or relevance are the SEM modes.

Dissonance Approaches

Prevention programs based on cognitive dissonance and the use of the Internet have been widely and successfully implemented among female college models, but their use has not yet filtered down to the school setting. Cognitive Dissonance Theory has generally been used with at-risk women, and outside of the school setting. This approach intersects nicely with models of interactive and student-centered learning as well as fitting with the principles of developing media literacy, making it a good fit for the school setting. The focus on public sharing of attitudes that contradict societal body standards could potentially be useful for all students, with and without body image problems, as it would assist in creating healthier peer norms that would extend the benefits of the program beyond the time in which it is presented. Trials among at-risk adolescent girls (17 years) outside the school setting have been effective and suggest that dissonance-based approaches could potentially be trialed in schools with older year levels (15 years and over), provided that teachers or facilitators were well trained in the use of this approach.

The Internet offers a broad range of opportunities for programs designed to improve body image in a range of populations and such approaches could potentially be broadly disseminated at very low cost, and with minimal teacher training, making them an exciting new possibility for school-based prevention. The use of the Internet offers the additional benefit of enabling both a universal and targeted program as initial activities can include screening for risk factors and tailoring the subsequent content. For example, ‘Student Bodies’ is an 8-week psycho-educational eating disorder prevention program that was developed in the United States and trialed among female adolescents (mean age 15.1 years) and their parents. It is recommended that future research investigate the use of cognitive dissonance and Internet-based approaches in schools.

Offering incentives to participate

There is a considerable literature and strong theoretical base underpinning the issue of incentives for survey participation (Dillman, Smyth & Christian, 2009; Sue & Ritter, 2007). Relevant theories are social exchange theory and cognitive dissonance theory. According to social exchange theory, perceived benefits in the form of incentives to participate must outweigh the costs of participation (i.e., the time and effort to complete the survey). Perceived benefits include both material incentives like cash payments, free gifts or prize draws (extrinsic rewards) and intangible ones such as feelings of enjoyment or a sense of social contribution from participating in a worthwhile project (intrinsic rewards). Cognitive dissonance theory helps illuminate social incentives for survey completion. For example, when individuals consider themselves helpful, kind or generous, refusing to participate is incompatible with their self-perception.

Dillman, Smyth and Christian (2009) viewed survey response as a voluntary action within a context of reciprocal social obligations, and showed how survey procedures can build a positive social exchange with prospective survey participants. Their research has demonstrated that a small token incentive given in advance of actual participation in a survey (e.g., $5 mailed with a postal survey) is more likely to elicit a survey response than is a much larger amount promised upon submission of a completed survey; the rationale is that this act creates a sense of reciprocal obligation and builds trust, and trust encourages participation.

Involvement in an activity related to the survey, for example, attending a conference, also increases the likelihood of survey participation (Sue & Ritter, 2007).

4.3.1 Situational determinants of how people defend BJW

In Hafer and Gosse (2010), we discuss a number of potential situational determinants of how people defend BJW in the face of threat. Drawing from equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1976), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and the motivated social cognition literature (Kruglanski, 1996), we organize these variables according to a number of general principles that guide how people pursue their desired ends.

First, strategies that are less effortful or more available will be pursued more than those that are more effortful or less available. Therefore, Hafer and Gosse (2010) suggest that some situational characteristics likely influence the degree to which specific BJW-defense strategies are pursued by affecting perceived effortfulness or availability of strategies. For example, situations can contain cues that a victim is to blame for his or her situation (e.g., Haynes & Olson, 2006). In such a case, blaming the victim requires only moderate cognitive effort and therefore might be employed to a greater extent than other, more effortful ways of maintaining BJW. Additionally, according to justice motive theory, if helping a victim of injustice is unavailable as a means of preserving BJW, then people are more likely to engage in cognitive distortions (Lerner & Miller, 1978).

Second, Hafer and Gosse (2010) suggest that some situational variables affect the degree to which different BJW-defense strategies are employed because these variables influence the perceived effectiveness of the coping mechanisms. For example, people might be more willing to help an innocent victim who represents an isolated case rather than one of many such cases, perhaps because help in the latter situation is viewed as less effective at alleviating injustice (Miller, 1977; see also Kogut, 2011). Similarly, people might be more likely to help if aid is not so personally costly as to make them victims of injustice in the process (see Holmes, Miller, & Lerner, 2002).

Third, people are likely to prefer to attain their desired ends in ways that satisfy multiple motives. According to Hafer and Gosse (2010), therefore, a number of situational variables likely influence the degree to which people pursue particular modes of BJW-defense because these variables determine the extent to which other motives (aside from preserving BJW) are also met. For example, a person who is the perpetrator versus a third-party observer of an injustice might want to maintain BJW while avoiding feelings of guilt or social censure (see Chaikin & Darley, 1973). Derogating the victim of injustice could serve both motives better than some other strategies, such as compensating the victim.

Testing the kinds of situational determinants described in this section requires careful experimental design. Ideally, experiments would include at least the following three elements to test situational predictors of different ways of defending BJW: a manipulation of BJW-threat, measures to test at least two modes of BJW-defense, and a manipulation of a situational variable proposed to determine the degree to which strategy each will be pursued. With these components, one could test, for instance, whether use of one strategy is greater for level 1 of the situational determinant than for level 2, and use of another strategy is greater for level 2 of the situational determinant. To be clear evidence of BJW-defense, this pattern should occur only when threat to BJW is high, not when threat is low. Alternatively, one could test whether one strategy is used more in the high versus low threat condition at level 1 of the situational determinant, whereas another strategy is used more in the high versus low threat condition at level 2 of the situational determinant.

Most studies are unable to test such relations because they do not include all three elements noted in the previous paragraph, although there are a few exceptions (e.g., Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005, Study 1; Warner et al., 2012, Study 4). In one exception, Warner et al. (2012, Study 4) found that the temporal distance of victimization determined the degree to which people endorsed different BJW-defense strategies. When BJW-threat was high, participants who were told the victimization took place in the recent past blamed the victim’s behavior more than did participants told the victimization was in the distant past. To the contrary, participants who were told the victimization took place in the distant past blamed the character of the victim more and saw greater benefits in her suffering than did participants who thought the victimization was in the recent past. The authors interpreted their findings in terms of construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), in that psychologically distant events prompt global judgments (as in character attributions or estimations of benefits), whereas psychologically close events prompt context-specific judgments (like blaming specific behaviors preceding a victimization event). In terms of Hafer and Gosse’s (2010) organization of BJW-defense strategies, Warner et al.’s (2012) temporal distance variable probably influenced endorsement of different strategies through the availability principle. That is, temporal distance might have affected the availability of BJW-defense strategies that required different modes of thinking.

To summarize, many situational variables determine how people defend BJW when confronted with a threatening injustice. These variables likely have their influence through general principles affecting preferences for alternative ways to manage threat. Of course, how people engage in BJW-defense is determined not only by situational characteristics, but also by characteristics of the person. In the following section, we discuss our own research on this topic.

Effects on taste product experiences

One early study of the effects of information on taste experience was conducted by Carlsmith and Aronson (1963). These researchers presented a series of sweet or bitter solutions to consumers who evaluated them for their intensity. Before presenting each, they gave a signal to indicate that either a bitter or sweet stimulus would be presented. In some cases the signal accurately cued the taste solution being presented, but in other cases the cue was misleading, e.g. a signal for a bitter solution was given, but a sweet solution was presented. Their results showed that sweet solutions that disconfirmed a taste expectation were rated less intense than sweet solutions that confirmed a taste expectancy. However, bitter solutions that disconfirmed an expectation were rated more intense. In both cases, disconfirmed expectations resulted in a more negative experience (less sweet or more bitter). They concluded that the data supported Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957), a psychological theory that proposes that when cognitions (beliefs, values, attitudes, perceptions) or behaviors are inconsistent with one another, a negative psychological state of ‘dissonance’ occurs that makes the individual evaluate the stimulus more negatively.

Olson and Dover (1976) performed a similar study on the taste of coffee. These researchers assigned consumers to an information or control condition. In the information condition, consumers were given written information that the coffee had ‘no bitterness’. After reading the information, consumers rated the strength of their belief that the coffee would be either ‘very bitter’, ‘fairly bitter’, ‘somewhat bitter’, or ‘not at all bitter’. Several days later, they returned to taste and evaluate the actual coffee using the same procedure to assess their perceptions of its bitterness. The consumers in the control condition merely came to the taste test session and evaluated the coffee. Figure 4.8 shows the results of the study. The arrows indicate the expected belief strength of the information group before tasting the coffee. As can be seen, when compared to the control group, the information group's experience of the bitterness of the tasted coffee moved in the direction of their expectations of it, supporting an ‘assimilation’ of the expectation into the product experience.

Cardello and Sawyer (1992) conducted a study in which consumers were given one of four different types of information about pomegranate juice, i.e. that the juice was ‘very bitter’, had ‘average bitterness’, was ‘not bitter at all’, or no information. The consumers rated their expected experience of the bitterness and other sensory and hedonic attributes of the juice prior to tasting it. The results showed that the information established different expectations for the bitterness of the juice that were consistent with the information. However, the ratings of the bitterness experienced in the tasted product showed both assimilation and contrast effects, similar to the findings of Scharf and Volkmer (2000).

Lastly, in a recent study examining the role of information about the area of origin of olive oils (Carporale et al., 2006), users of Italian olive oils were led to believe that a particular oil had been produced in one of three different olive oil producing regions of Italy. Expectations of the bitterness and pungency of the oil were found to differ depending upon the regional information provided about the oil. Moreover, these expectations were assimilated into the ratings of the actual experience of the bitterness and pungency of the oil.

2.1.3 Establishing reality from cognitive consistency

In his introductory chapter to the landmark book, Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook (1968), Newcomb described the remarkable emergence of scientific attention to cognitive consistency motives (see Newcomb, 1968, p. xv): “… So it was a decade or so ago when at least a half dozen of what we shall call ‘cognitive consistency’ theories appeared more or less independently in the psychological literature. They were proposed under different names, such as balance, congruity, symmetry, dissonance, but all had in common the notion that the person behaves in a way that maximizes the internal consistency of his cognitive system; and, by extension, that groups behave in ways that maximize the internal consistency of their interpersonal relations.” To provide just a flavor of how people work to establish realities that make sense to them, we will briefly consider Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory.

Dissonance theory is concerned with resolving cognitive inconsistencies in order to make sense of what has happened. Importantly, the theory of cognitive dissonance was conceptualized by Festinger in terms of truth, in terms of establishing what is real. According to Festinger (1957, p. 260), “the human organism tries to establish internal harmony, consistency, or congruity among his opinions, attitudes, knowledge, and values.” When people fail to do so, they experience dissonance, which gives rise to pressures to reduce that dissonance. Importantly, he states (1957, p. 3): “In short, I am proposing that dissonance, that is, the existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions, is a motivating factor in its own right.”

A classic example of people trying to make sense of an event that produced dissonance is described by Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956) in their book, When Prophecy Fails. The study was inspired by a headline they saw in the local newspaper: “Prophecy from planet Clarion call to city: flee that flood.” Here was a group of people expecting that alien beings from planet Clarion would arrive on earth on a specific date and take them away on a flying saucer (thereby saving them from the great flood that would then end the world). Festinger and his colleagues predicted that this expectancy would be disconfirmed, which would create dissonance especially because many members of the group had made sacrifices like quitting jobs and giving away possessions in preparation for leaving the earth. And, indeed, it was disconfirmed.

One solution to this truth problem would be to try to make sense of what happened by establishing some new reality. This solution would involve creating new truths that are consistent with their previous beliefs and actions. This happened. New judgments about the present and predictions about the future were made that were consistent with the original belief, with the disconfirming event being treated like a bump in the road. After disconfirmation, for example, there was a sharp increase in the frequency with which group members decided that other people who telephoned them or visited their group were actually spacemen. They tried to get orders and messages from the “spacemen” for a future reality that would be consistent with their original beliefs.

Another way to make sense of what happened is to maintain the same belief about being taken away in a flying saucer but just change the date. This would justify the sacrifices that were made by increasing the value of their original belief. To strengthen the belief, new converts would be needed, which requires proselytizing. Indeed, this also occurred, with some group members proselytizing their beliefs after the disconfirmation. Notably, this proselytizing solution reflects not only effort justification but also the motivation to create a shared reality with others that their beliefs are true. This is yet another way to establish what is real that we discuss next.

2 History of Cross-pressure Analysis

Cross-pressure theory entered political science via the analysis of voting behavior at Columbia University (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948, Berelson et al. 1954) and the University of Michigan (Campbell et al. 1954, Campbell et al. 1960). The basic notion of cross-pressures, however, is considerably older. The idea that persons and other living entities, who are pushed (or pulled) in two (or more) directions at once, and hence are burdened by special cognitive and behavioral difficulties, is ancient. It can be found, for example, in Aesop's fable of the donkey starving to death between two equidistant piles of hay. In the more recent academic literature, the concept of cross-pressures can be traced to the writings of Georg Simmel. Simmel (e.g., 1921), however, did not employ the German equivalent of ‘cross-pressures.’ He used ‘Kreuzung sozialer Kreise,’ which strictly translated means ‘the crossing of social circles.’ It was Bendix (in Simmel 1955), who translated Simmel's phrase into ‘cross-pressures.’

The general idea of conflicting pressures received systematic attention almost simultaneously in political science and sociology, as well as in psychology and social psychology. In sociology the theory was stated mostly in terms of ‘status equilibrium’ and ‘status crystallization’ (Lenski 1961, 1964). The psychological fields generated the concept and theory of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger et al. 1956, Festinger 1957. Cognitive dissonance theory has had a more illustrious career than its political-science and sociological equivalents. Indeed, the concept of cognitive dissonance has entered popular speech, even political campaigns. There has been serious and significant work in respect to cognitive dissonance, including sustained attention to systematic testing, improved measurement, and theoretical refinement of the propositions of cognitive dissonance (Davis 1993, Rabin 1991, Shultz and Lepper 1996). Such efforts are largely lacking in respect to cross-pressures. Only a single monograph exists exploring the nature, accuracy, and utility of cross-pressure theory (Sperlich 1971).

After an initial flurry of interest in studies of voting behavior—where it generally failed to produce confirmed predictions and useful explanations (see Sperlich 1971, pp. 9–26)—cross-pressure theory has fallen into almost universal disuse, even in voting behavior studies. Benney (1956), for example, provided a detailed analysis of social class voting, of multiple influences on voting choice, and of those who changed their voting intention during the campaign. He also used the term ‘group pressure’—not, however, any real cross-pressure analysis. Similarly, Butler and Stokes (1974) spoke occasionally about ‘cleavages [that] cut across the electorate,’ but did not engage in actual cross-pressure analysis in their study of British voting behavior. Books dealing explicitly with conflict show a similar neglect (for example, Lipset 1985, Porter and Taplin 1987, Reilley and Sigall 1976), as do works in most other sub-fields. Kourvetaris (1997), for example, presents a conflict model of political sociology, but makes no use of cross-pressures concepts; psychologically oriented examples include; Freedman and Freedman 1975, Renshon 1974, Stone 1974, Moran 1985), rejects what he calls a ‘civility model’ and develops a ‘conflict model’ instead, dealing extensively with social cleavages, such as those associated with class, religion, race, and nationality.

Moran's book seemed well suited for the use of the idea of cross-pressures—but it did not make any such use. Similarly, Mayer (1977) included discussions of class conflict, cognitive dissonance, and cross-cutting vs. segmental cleavages, but not of cross-pressures (for other examples see: Almond and Verba 1963, Duverger 1972, and Meny and Knapp 1998). Rokkan (1970) developed a ‘cleavage model’ of politics without the use of cross-pressures. Numerous general discussions of politics, political systems, and political behavior entirely, or largely, omit discussions of cross-pressures (e.g., Alker 1973, Bellamy 1993, Delury 1987, Eulau 1996, Needler 1996, and Polsby et al. 1963).

3.2 Bolstering motives associated with proattitudinal message processing

Although negativity effects on processing are supported by much research, we believe that there are many situations in which people seek, process, and rely upon information perceived as positive (proattitudinal) rather than negative (counterattitudinal). For example, in the context of verbal communication, people use positive evaluative words more frequently than negative evaluative words (e.g., Boucher & Osgood, 1969; Matlin & Stang, 1978). Similar biases have been found when individuals form impressions of others. People report more positive than negative traits about others (e.g., Benjafield, 1984; Tuohy & Stradling, 1987). Furthermore, when people draw inferences about others’ abilities, perceivers rely more on positive than on negative performance information (because positive information is more diagnostic in these contexts; e.g., Reeder & Fulks, 1980; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).

Closer to the domain of persuasion, studies of selective exposure to information include many examples of people seeking predominantly attitude-consistent rather than attitude-inconsistent information (see Hart et al., 2009, for a review). Much of this research has been guided by cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964). From this perspective, biases toward choice of consonant (proattitudinal) information are propelled by a desire to avoid the inconsistency that comes from free choice of exposure to dissonant (counterattitudinal) information. Especially when experiencing the negative state associated with dissonance (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990), consonant (proattitudinal) information should be perceived as likely to facilitate one's goal to reduce the discomfort. In contrast, dissonant (counterattitudinal) information would only work against this pursuit (and increase feelings of discomfort). Thus, under these circumstances, people should be motivated to seek out information that is attitude-consistent and to avoid information that is attitude-inconsistent (see Frey, 1986; Smith, Fabrigar, & Norris, 2008).

We believe that similar motives to support or strengthen one's attitude often guide the processing of proattitudinal persuasive messages. A number of factors might influence the level of bolstering motivation that one experiences and the extent to which the message is viewed as likely to advance rather than thwart that motivation. For example, as discussed earlier, a number of strength-related attitudinal properties are associated with perceptions that an existing opinion is already correct (and not in need of additional support, see Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Therefore, recipients with a relatively strong attitude should feel little need to bolster by devoting cognitive resources to information perceived as redundant with existing views. In contrast, when the premessage attitude is weak, recipients may prefer to hold an opinion that is stronger. In some cases, the weakness of the attitude stems from an attitude quality associated with an experience of discomfort (as in attitude ambivalence or uncertainty, Van Harreveld, Van der Pligt, & De Liver, 2009). In such cases, the presence of a proattitudinal message should be perceived as a good opportunity to strengthen one's weak opinion—to increase subjective feelings of correctness (a key motivation underlying attitude formation and change; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and reduce any discomfort associated with the weak attitude. Hence, these message recipients should be motivated to engage in careful attention to and effortful processing of proattitudinal information.

One version of a goal to strengthen attitudes was used to explain motivations to process in the HSM (Chaiken et al., 1989). That is, regardless of the position of a message, recipients were said to process information in an effort to increase confidence in their attitude to a point that matched their desired confidence. For the most part, this idea was used to account for differences in processing motivation across levels of issue importance or personal relevance (where the level of desired confidence would be higher for more important/relevant topics). However, some research also suggested that this processing can be selective, based on whether message recipients believe that the processing will, indeed, increase their confidence. For example, Bohner, Rank, Reinhard, Einwiller, and Erb (1998) provided research participants with false feedback about what type of information they could most effectively process (i.e., topic or person information). Later, when lacking desired confidence, those same participants only engaged in increased processing if the available information was of a type that they presumed they could effectively process. We believe that motives to support or strengthen one's attitude would be broader than the construct of confidence and would more generally direct message recipients toward processing of proattitudinal rather than counterattitudinal information.

In addition to attitudinal properties creating bolstering motives, aspects of the communication itself could also influence the existence and strength of such motivation. For example, various characteristics of the persuasive attempt might alter expectations regarding whether the desirable (proattitudinal) outcomes seem likely to occur. When such desirable outcomes seem possible but uncertain, the extent of support for the person's current attitude may seem insufficient or tenuous. In these cases, message recipients might seek information that would reassure them and enhance their perceptions that the favorable outcomes may yet come to fruition.

Consider a proattitudinal message presented by a high-quality source—one expected to supply effective arguments and, thus, one likely to succeed in implementing the proposal. In this case, the message itself should be taken as very nonthreatening, highly supportive, and the positive outcomes espoused should be viewed as likely to come to fruition. Thus, at moderate background levels of motivation and ability to process the message, an active bolstering attempt may seem unnecessary and recipients may choose to conserve resources rather than actively process the information. On the other hand, this same message from a source with dubious credentials or other indicators of ineffectiveness should send a very different signal. This advocate should be viewed as likely to provide inadequate support to one's views and would make the proposed positive outcomes seem relatively unlikely to happen. Because of these shortcomings, recipients’ motivation to bolster their position may be substantial. They may be motivated to carefully attend to the message as a means to ensure (or hope) that their own views are indeed “correct” and/or that the outcomes they prefer are still likely to occur.

What theory of motivation is related to the idea that customers desire?

Which specific need and buying behaviour values personal accomplishment and places a premium on products that signify success?

Why are approach

Which of the following needs from Maslow's hierarchy?